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Uniform State Antitrust Act: Toward
Creation of a National Antitrust Policy
Alan Arnold* and Tom Ford
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
along with the American Bar Association, is now considering a tentative
draft of a uniform statute designed to prohibit certain anti-competitive
activities.' This proposed statute, prepared by the Legislative Research
Center of the University of Michigan, is called the Uniform State Antitrust Act.2
Although Commerce Clearing House states that "basically, the proposed Uniform State Antitrust
Act follows the federal antiALAN ARNOLD (B.S.S., John Carroll Univertrust laws,"3 some startling insity, LL.B., Western Reserve University) is an
attorney with the Great Lakes Field Office of
novations are embodied in this
the Antitrust Division of the United States Destatute which find no parallel
partment of Justice. He is a member of the
Antitrust Law Committee of the Ohio State
either in the Sherman Act,4
Bar Association.
the Clayton Act,5 the RobinTOM FORD (B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University,
son-Patman Act,6 or the AntiLL.B., Western Reserve University) is a practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio. Formerly
trust Civil Process Act.7 In
an attorney with the Antitrust Division of the
quantity alone, there is a conUnited States Department of Justice, he also is
a member of the Antitrust Law Committee of
siderable difference, for the
the Ohio State Bar Association.
proposed Uniform Act contains
more sections than the cited
federal statutes combined.
OHIO'S VALENTINE ACT:

A COMPARISON

Only a few superficial similarities may be found between the sixteen
ingenuous provisions (including penalties) of the Ohio regulatory statute
known as the Valentine Act 8 and the proposed Uniform Act, which is
* The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions or
policies of the Antitrust Division.
1. This effort might be considered as complementary to the Uniform Commercial Code, now
effective in Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE chs. 1301-09. (Hereinafter cited as CODE 5.)
2. Referred to in the text as the Uniform Act. (Hereinafter cited in footnotes as ACT 5.)
3. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 50199, at 55221 (Aug. 28, 1963).
4. 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 1-8 (1958).
5. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5512-27 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21 (Supp. IV, 1963), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
6. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1958).
7. 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. 5§1311-14 (Supp. IV, 1963).
8. CODE 55 1331.01-.99.
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composed of forty complex sections. The Valentine Act hardly passes
as a model of draftsmanship. The heart of the statute prohibits the formation of a "trust."9 A trust is defined in the Ohio law ° as a combination formed for any of the following purposes: (1) to restrict trade;"
(2) to limit production of a commodity or fix its price;' (3) to prevent
competition in a commodity;' 3 (4) "to fix [a commodity] at a standard
or figure whereby its price .

.

. is .

.

. controlled;"' 4 (5) to contract or

agree (a) not to sell a commodity below a common standard figure or
fixed value, (b) to maintain the price at a fixed or graduated figure,
(c) to "settle the price" so as to restrain competition, directly or indirectly, or (d) to unite so as to affect the price. 5 For purpose of this short
summary, it is sufficient to observe that there is a lack of mutual exclusivity in the list of forbidden purposes, 6 and that clarity as an aid to enforcement is not a virtue of the Ohio statute.'
The proposed Uniform Act, on the other hand, verbalizes the prohibited activities in terms parallel to federal antitrust law as it now appears to stand in the light of Supreme Court interpretation of the pertinent federal statutes. The three most essential of the substantive sections' 8 forbid: (1) combinations in unreasonable restraint of trade;'"
(2) exercise of monopoly power to exclude competition or fix prices;2"
9. CODE § 1331.02.
10. CODE 5 1331.01(B).

11.

CODE

5 1331.01 (B) (1).

12. CODE § 1331.01 (B) (2).
13. CODE 5 1331.01(B) (3).
14. CODE 5 1331.01 (B) (4).
15. CODE 5 1331.01 (B) (5). Other prohibitions relate to specific industries. See CODE
§ 1331.05 (controlling supply or price of certain staples); CODE § 1331.15 (discriminatory
prices offered by dealers in dairy products).
16. This fault was recognized implicitly when the General Assembly rendered the provisions
of the Valentine Act cumulative. CODE § 1331.14.
17. Judicial construction has not illuminated the Valentine Act. Only a handful of antitrust
cases have reached the Supreme Court of Ohio. Lack of interest by the office of the Ohio
Attorney General no doubt is responsible for this lack of litigation. This office does not have
an antitrust staff, and the volumes of the Opinions of the Attorney General of Ohio reveal
little antitrust interest in that office. See also note 62 infra and accompanying text.
18. These sections, along with the remainder of the first twenty-two sections and accompanying comments of the Legislative Research Center draftsmen, are reprinted in CCH Trade
Regulation Reports. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 50199, at 55222-31 (Aug. 28, 1963).
19. Acr § 2. Compare the Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). According to the draftsmen's comment, the language of the federal
statute was employed to make federal decisions available as precedent. No chances are taken,
however; the "rule of reason," as enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
60 (1911), is guaranteed application by insertion of word "unreasonable."
20. Acr § 3 (a). Here the draftsmen are not consistent with the intent stated in the comment to § 2 of making "available to state courts the entire body of federal precedent." The
inconsistency lies in the definition of unlawful exercise of monopoly power in terms of the
current judicial definition: to exclude competition or to fix prices. See United States v. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380, 389 (1956). State anti-monopoly law is thus
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(3) combinations formed to establish monopoly power; 2 ' (4) combinations by persons "in competition"2 2 (a) to fix prices,23 (b) to control
production for purposes of price regulation, 4 (c) to allocate markets;2 5
(5) combinations to bid collusively on public contracts;26 and (6) combinations between persons refusing to deal,27 with certain "exceptions"
which may or may not be exceptions, depending on court interpretation."
The enforcement provisions of the Valentine Act are simple. A contract in violation of the law is declared void.2" Foreign business organizations which violate the statute are prohibited from doing business in
Ohio." Private double-damage actions are sanctioned.3 A "forfeiture"
of $50 to the state is sanctioned for each day of violation after receipt of
notice from the state attorney general or any county prosecutor, and the
state may recover this "sum ''3 in any county where the offense is committed or where the offenders reside.
On the criminal side, participation in an unlawful trust bears a penalty of $50 to $5,000, or six months to one year.34 Quo warranto and
the usual forms of injunctive relief also are available to the attorney general in any county where the business exists, does business, or has a
domicile."
The simplicity of the remedial provisions of the state statute, however, finds no correlative in the proposed Uniform Act. For example,
frozen to the present state of federal precedent, without opportunity to grow as that precedent
might develop.
21. AcT § 3(b).
22. Acr § 4(a).
The statute does not state whether the competitors must be "in competition" with each other, but mutual competition seems to be the meaning intended by the
draftsmen.
23. AcT § 4 (a) (1).
24. AcT § 4(a) (2).
25. AcT 4(a) (3).
26. AcT 4(b).
27. AcT 4(c).
28. Most of the sting is taken out of this prohibition on combined refusals to deal by excepting the following: "(1) a refusal to deal by associations, trading boards, or exchanges
when predicated upon a failure to comply with rules of membership, (2) exclusive dealing
arrangements, or (3) exclusive territorial wholesale distributorships or retail dealerships.
Refusals to deal excepted under this subsection may be unlawful under section 2 [unreasonable
restraints of trade]." As one of the most common forms of local refusals to deal, exclusive territorial distributorships ought not to be relegated to evidence of an unreasonable combination.
29. CODE § 1331.06.
30. CODE § 1331.07.
31. CODE 5 1331.08.
32. CODE
1331.03.
33. The use of this neutral word is noteworthy, for the statute thereby avoids a policy declaration whether the penalty is civil or criminal in nature. Compare AcT § 11, with comment to
that section.
34. CODE § 1331.99(A) (Supp. 1963).
35. CODE § 1331.11.
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the Ohio law contains no provision which provides for a post-conviction
forfeiture. None is needed, for the availability of the broad quo warranto
power ensures against repeated violations by the same business organization. The Uniform State Antitrust Act, on the other hand, contains
three3 ' sizable sections delimiting these remedies, including proceedings
for (1) forfeiture of charter rights and privileges of domestic associations," (2) dissolution of such associations," (3) forfeitures of the
privileges of foreign associations to do business in the state,39 (4) revocation or suspension of a limited number of privileges belonging either to
domestic or foreign corporations," and (5) court refusal of the privilege to do business in the state of a person or organization who succeeds
to the rights of one subjected to (2) or (3) above.41
INVESTIGATIVE PROVISIONS

The most drastic innovations sponsored by the framers of the Uniform State Antitrust Act are found in the provisions for the investigation
of violations. By no means are these bold, hydra-headed investigatory
weapons to be construed as a copy of the new federal Antitrust Civil
Process Act.'
The first four of these sections43 in the Uniform Act, to be sure, parallel
the federal statute both in length and ambiguity.44 These sections permit
service of a civil4 5 investigative demand on a person under investigation
for violation of the antitrust laws. That, however, is only the beginning.
Section 27 of the Uniform Act authorizes the attorney general
to apply to a trial court for an order requiring "any person not under in36. AcT 55 8-10.
37. Acr 5 8.
38. ACT 5 8.
39. ACT
9.
40. Acr 5 8.
41. AcT 5 10.
42. 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (Supp. IV, 1963).
43. AcT §§ 23-26.
44. An important provision of these investigative statutes is found in § 23 (g) of the Uniform Act. This section requires a suspected violator to make documentary material "available
for inspection and copying." A problem arises as to what constitutes the "inspection" which
logically must precede "copying." May the representative of the attorney general blithely
thumb through a mass of material and then declare that the entire file is pertinent and must
be copied? Or, must the representative engage in a thorough examination of each document
before selecting those which must be copied?
45. This "conscious parallelism" with federal law appears to be a misnomer. Why limit
the use of the process to civil investigations? Although it is true that the federal act is so
limited, this restriction is not particularly desirable, especially when immunity is provided.
Moreover, the draftsmen of the Uniform Act probably anticipated that the "CID" would be
available in investigations in which "civil" penalties are contemplated. AcT § 11. If, however, a common-sense judicial approach should regard as non-binding this characterization of
penalties, the "CID" would be available only when injunction is the sole remedy contemplated-
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vestigation"' to make documentary material available to the
general or another authorized state employee for inspection or
Only "reason to believe" that such person has access to the
proven to be necessary for investigation of a possible violation is
in obtaining the court order.4 7

attorney
copying.
material
required

The power of local officials to investigate violations of state antitrust
law under the proposed Uniform Act does not end with examination of
documents in the hands of persons not under investigation. In one of the
most unusual investigative procedures ever outlined in a state statute,48
section 28 of the Uniform Act permits the attorney general to
subpoena "an individual" whom he "has reason to believe" possesses "information or knowledge of a possible violation of the act,..." to appear
before him and give oral testimony "in accordance with the rules governing depositions ... ." All of these machinations may be accomplished
without application to a court.49
The draftsmen of the act provided immunity for witnesses in section
31."' This section resolves a problem which the federal courts
have not yet settled 5 by denying immunity to members of an association
or partnership who are not called to testify or whose association documents are produced pursuant to court order.

46.

Emphasis added.

Compare KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-153 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:143-45
STAT. § 416.320 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-10 (repl. 1960); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 79, § 82 (1961). These statutes grant similar powers, but annotations reveal that
they seldom have been invoked.
47.

(1950); Mo. REV.

48. A few state attorneys general possess similar, unused powers. KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-153 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:143-45 (1950); Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.310 (1959);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 343; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-10 (repl. 1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79
§ 82 (1961); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1636 (1953). None of these statutes offers the following combination of high-handed measures found in the Uniform Act: (1) "reason to believe"
that an individual has information or knowledge of a possible violation as sufficient excuse
for issuance of the subpoena; (2) "appearance before himself [the attorney general];" (3) administration of the oath by the attorney general; (4) taking of the testimony by him; (5)
power of the attorney general to apply to court for subpoenaing a witness more than one
hundred miles from the hearing; and, most importantly, (6) no need for a court order or
application to a magistrate before issuance of a subpoena.
49. Nonchalantly, the comment appended to § 28 regards as noteworthy only that portion
of the section which requires court approval to subpoena a witness from beyond a 100 mile
radius.
50. The comment to § 28 (investigation through oral testimony) relies on the "automatic
immunity" provided in § 31. The immunity section, however, is not so worded as to be
clearly automatic. To be sure, § 31 specifies that the privilege against self-incrimination
need not be claimed in order for immunity to be extended. The explication does not serve
the cause of interpretation; for, with the offering of immunity, no privilege remains to be
claimed. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
51.

See, e.g., United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789, 790 (2d Cir. 1963).
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NEED FOR A UNIFORM ACT

The first tentative draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act does not
have a preamble setting forth the purposes of the proposed legislation."
In a prefatory note, however, the draftsmen have stated their views with
respect to the reasons for and goals to be achieved by this legislation.
In considering any proposed uniform legislation, it first must be determined that the subject matter of the legislation lends itself to such
uniform treatment. The authors agree that there is a paramount need
for additional legislation in this area and that, to be truly effective, it must
be uniform.
As outlined above, the present law in Ohio is antiquated53 and hence
inadequate.54 The authors have found this and other defects present in
most of the state antitrust laws. As a result, "local" market restraints
have contributed to deterioration of the economic climate in certain areas
of the United States. The states cannot and should not rely on the agencies of the federal government to remedy these "local" restraints. Federal jurisdictional and budget limitations preclude such agencies from investigating and remedying every "local" restraint. In addition, in areas
where state and federal agencies have concurrent jurisdiction, the state
remedy, as the draftsmen note, may be more appropriate.
The authors suggest that there should be a spirit of "cooperative federalism" between the federal and state antitrust agencies in areas of concurrent jurisdiction.55 This would consist primarily of notification and
coordination between these branches with respect to their respective interests and responsibilities. In addition to referrals of private complaints
by one branch when the other branch is more appropriate, the federal and
state branches, as the draftsmen suggest, should also develop areas of
"primary responsibility." These areas, of course, would be the subject of
discussions between federal and state officials. The draftsmen suggest,
however, that generally the states should have primary responsibility for

52. Such policy statements are not common in uniform state laws. When the proposed
statute propounds the basic economic policy of the state government, the insertion of a preamble is nonetheless advisable as an aid to interpretation.
53. The prohibition of the formation of a "trust," which is the only significant policy
declaration presented by the Valentine Act, might be compared with the unreasonable restraint of trade prohibited by § 2 of the Uniform Act. See CODE § 1331.01 (B). This general prohibition is not accompanied by any of the specific prohibitions which have accounted
for much of the success of the Clayton Act. See 38 Star. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. IV, 1963), 29 U.S.C. 5 52 (1958).
Compare Act § 4.
54. Similar obsolescence necessitated passage of the Clayton Act. See note 53 supra.
55. Prefatory Note, p. 2 (Unpublished initial draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act,
Legislative Research Comm., Univ. of Mich. School of Law 1963). See also AcT § 34.
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restraints "in retail distribution and wholesaling and manufacturing for
essentially local consumption, as well as ...wholly intrastate restraints.""
Cooperative federalism can be achieved effectively only if the states
have uniform antitrust acts parallel to the federal antitrust laws. If state
antitrust laws were uniform, compliance with the state acts usually"T
would be assured by compliance with the federal laws. More importantly, uniform legislation on the state level will provide a remedy for "local"
restraints which will have an impact similar to that of the federal antitrust laws, provided that the state laws are enforced adequately in each
state.
The policy of the federal and state laws should coalesce, for coalescence would provide a salutary counter-force to the anti-competitive
trends in our economy. Only a uniform state law can accomplish total
policy coordination. Assuming that this proposed Uniform Act were
adopted and adequately enforced,"5 some question arises as to whether it
provides local enforcement authorities with sufficient legislative weapons
to meld federal and state anti-monopoly policies. Without this melding,
local restraints, which often constitute incipient interstate restraints, cannot be eliminated with consistency.
SOME SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS

In their prefatory note, the draftsmen consider this proposed legislation
as supplemental to the federal antitrust laws, and the authors agree that supplementation is the sound approach. Unfortunately, the proposed Uniform Act is not sufficiently complementary to the federal laws to render
supplementation effective. Certainly, some provisions, such as that with
respect to unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce," substantially
parallel the federal laws.6" Other sections, however, have no place in a
state act. For example, section 27 provides for the use of the civil investigative demand to secure documents from those persons not under
investigation."' Aside from the practical difficulties of passage of an
act containing such procedures,6 2 these provisions are out of touch with
56. See Prefatory Note, op. cit. supra note 55, at 3.
57. Occasions might arise in which local interpretation would be more stringent than that
followed by federal courts and federal enforcement agencies. Under these rare circumstances, compliance with federal standards would not be sufficient to assure freedom from
local prosecution.
58. The authors have recently interviewed the Honorable William Saxbe, Attorney General
of Ohio. He indicated that improvement of the law definitely would be followed by greater
enforcement by his office. But see note 17 supra.
59. AcT § 2.
60. But see note 20 supra.
61. See also Acr § 28 with respect to testimony to be compelled by civil investigative demand.
62. The political pressure to which state attorneys general and prosecutors must respond
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the supplementary character of the state legislation. Certainly, provisions
such as these should be enacted first on the federal level.63
The proposed Uniform Act does contain some provisions not found in
the federal laws. 4 These provisions do not detract from its supplementary
character. Notably absent from the proposed uniform legislation, however, are any provisions restricting mergers and acquisitions. The framers
indicate that the reason for this absence is that the states should "be slow
to take on complex economic issues especially associated . . ." with this
matter.6 5 Further, it is contended that this is apparently not a matter for
state antitrust concern. 6 The authors disagree.
Numerous states have considered this problem of sufficient importance to merit the passage of anti-merger provisions. Some of these acts
parallel 7 section 7 of the Clayton Act, 8 and some impose much more
stringent limitations on mergers and acquisitions." A provision similar
to section 7 of the Clayton Act would provide the states with an opportunity to retard the trend toward industrial concentration.7
As the
draftsmen point out, 1 the states can reach certain mergers under the provisions regarding unreasonable restraints.7
Section 2 of the Uniform Act, however, is not enough. Without
a specific anti-merger section, state enforcement agencies remain in the
same position in which the United States Department of Justice found
itself prior to the passage of section 7 of the Clayton Act. By the
time a series of inter-company acquisitions had reached sufficient proporoccasionally leaves them indisposed to enforce antitrust laws against local businessmen. With
this reluctance in mind, it is extremely doubtful that state legislators would foist such sweeping powers on these unwilling recipients.
63. The authors are not proposing that the states must yield to federal leadership in the area
of antitrust investigative procedures. Rather, the political bombshell inherent in the drastic
investigative powers proposed renders their insertion inadvisable. On the other hand, should
enforcement agents find a need for such powers, they can later pressure the legislatures for
relief. Meanwhile, the vital substantive provisions of the Uniform Act should not be
sacrificed as a result of the political dangers embodied in inserting investigative procedures
not yet found necessary even at the federal level.
64. ACT §§ 8, 9, relating to forfeiture of charter rights or the right to do business in the
state, as the case may be.
65. Prefatory Note, op. cit. supra note 55, at 4.
66. Ibid.
67. Hawaii Laws, act 190, § 5 (1961); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:125(B) (1950); Miss. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 1094 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-10 (1939); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT.
art. 7427 (1960).
68. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21 (Supp. IV,1963), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
69. See ARIK. STAT. ANN. § 70-105 (1947); OKLA. CoNsr. art. 9, § 41; OKLA. STAT.
tit. 79, § 31 (1951); S.C. CODa 5 66-61 (1952).
70. STrAFF oF SENATE TmPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D SaSS.
(1941) (Monograph 16).
71. Prefatory Note, op. cit. supra note 55, at 4.
72. ACT § 2.

WESTERN

RESERVE LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. 15:102

tions to constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, the problems of
divestiture were so complex that an effective remedy was not available.7 3
Meanwhile, many potential competitors had been laid in their economic
graves. This economic history gives even greater reason for not leaving
the states in a similar position. What a wonderful opportunity is presented for halting mergers in their incipiency if local governments may
step in before interstate commerce is affected.
The authors also must disagree with the contention that such a provision would prove too difficult to enforce on the state level.74 The primary source of investigative complexity in federal merger cases is the
problem of determining the line of commerce involved (the product market) and the section of the country affected (the geographic market).
These complexities are reduced substantially when the anti-merger provision is adapted for state antitrust purposes.
Other predatory economic practices which at least merit careful consideration by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws are price discriminations of the type prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act7" and sales below cost. Both of these activities usually
take the form of a large, economically powerful organization using its
accumulated wealth to remove from competition or wring economic concessions from small, local businesses. Most states have found it desirable
to enact laws specifically prohibiting these activities," occasionally for
the stated purpose of insulating local businesses against the onslaughts of
large interstate corporations.7 7
CONCLUSION

The proposed Uniform State Antitrust Act is an important first step
toward the creation of a national antitrust policy. If modified in light
of the need for creation of such a policy and for halting the trend toward
economic concentration, it will merit passage by state legislatures.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81sT CONG., 1ST SESS. 5 (1949).
74. Prefatory Note, op. cit. supra note 55, at 4.
75. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1958).
76. See the reference to these laws in Table of Contents to State Laws, 4 TRADE REG. REP.
5 35001-008.
77. ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1462 (1956).

